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Legal Innovation and the Compliance Paradox
Emanuela Carbonara,* Francesco Parisi** &  Georg von 
Wangenheim***
INTRODUCTION
Following previous work,1 in this paper we study the 
interaction between legal and extralegal forces affecting 
human  conduct,  highlighting  the  possibility  of 
countervailing  effects  of  legal  innovation.  Traditionally, 
law and economics theory has relied on the conception of 
legal sanctions as prices in order to predict how changes 
in  the law affect  individual  behavior.  According to such 
models, individuals are motivated by external incentives 
and make decisions regarding legally relevant behavior by 
means of standard cost and benefits analysis.
The  price  model  was,  however,  questioned by non-
mainstream  economists  when  some  experimental 
evidence showed that individuals are often motivated by 
intrinsic rather than external incentives. For example, in a 
famous paper published in the Journal of Legal Studies, Uri 
Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini presented a field experiment 
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1
. See Francesco Parisi & Georg von Wangenheim,  Legislation and 
Countervailing  Effects  from  Social  Norms,  in EVOLUTION AND DESIGN OF 
INSTITUTIONS 25 (Christian Schubert & Georg von Wangenheim eds., 2006); 
Emanuela  Carbonara,  Francesco  Parisi  &  Georg  von  Wangenheim, 
Unjust Laws and Illegal Norms (Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 08-03, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1088742. While 
the  first  paper  focuses  on  the  interplay  between  a  mechanism  of 
interactive opinion formation and social norms, the second looks at the 
effect of sanctions on social  norms. This paper is  an attempt to link 
these two research lines.
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they  conducted  in  several  day-care  centers.2 Several 
centers lamented that many parents had the bad habit of 
coming  late  to  collect  their  children,  thus  leaving  the 
burden of personnel’s extra time on the center.  Gneezy 
and Rustichini tested the effects of introducing a fine for 
late-comers on parents’ behavior.3
According to the traditional economic model, the fine 
represents a price for the action of leaving children at the 
center  beyond  the  scheduled  time.  In  a  typical  cost-
benefit  analysis  the  fine  increases  the  price  of  coming 
late, and, therefore, fewer parents would do so. The result 
of  the  field  experiment  conducted  by  Gneezy  and 
Rustichini  was  surprisingly  different.  In  all  the  day-care 
centers in their study, there was a statistically significant 
increase  in  the  number  of  children  picked  up  late  by 
parents.4
There could be several explanations for such a result. 
For instance, the idea of paying a “price” for leaving the 
children late transformed a “bad action” by parents into a 
further service provided by the center,  and parents felt 
they  were  simply  buying  this  service.5 Alternatively, 
buying  more  day-care  for  their  children  substantially 
reduced or even cancelled the sense of guilt they might 
have felt at the thought of leaving their children for longer 
in  day-care  and  of  exploiting  the  center’s  personnel.6 
Whatever the motivation behind the observed behavior, 
the  main  issue  is  that  legal  intervention  (internal 
regulation  of  day-care  centers  in  this  case)  may  have 
totally  unexpected  results.  A  regulator  introducing  new 
rules assuming a wrong or incomplete model of  human 
behavior may trigger unintended forces and lead society 
to outcomes that are far from the social optimum.
The result at child day-care centers, albeit striking, is 
not the only one pointing out unintended results of (legal) 
rules.  In  another  paper,  Gneezy  and  Rustichini  provide 
further  experimental  evidence  of  behavior  opposite  to 
2
2
. See Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 
1 (2000).
3
3
. Id.
4
4
. Id. at 8.
5
5
. Id. at 11–13.
6
6
. Id. at 14.
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that predicted by the cost-benefit economic model.7 Also, 
Bohnet, Frey and Huck obtained results in sharp contrast 
with the prediction of the economic model. They present 
an  experiment  in  which  increasing  the  probability  of 
detecting  action  in  environments  with  weak institutions 
crowds  out  virtuous  social  norms  and  trustworthy 
behavior.8 Finally, the reaction of music downloaders and 
users  of  peer-to-peer  technologies,  whose  number  has 
increased after major labels and entertainment companies 
started  suing  copyright  infringers,  provide  interesting 
anecdotal  evidence of  the inadequacy of  the traditional 
economic model.9
The question of the true determinants of behavior in 
response  to  legal  rules  is  therefore  in  urgent  need  of 
theoretical analysis to explain the huge variety of results 
of legal innovation.
In  this  paper  we  attempt  to  answer  this  crucial 
question with the aid of a broader model.  The premise of 
our analysis is that human behavior is affected by factors 
beyond mere extrinsic  incentives.  These factors  include 
individual  values  and  social  norms  and  constitute  the 
intrinsic motivation of behavior. Often, intrinsic motivation 
and  extrinsic  incentives  push  individual  behavior  in 
opposite  directions.  For  instance,  the  generalized social 
norm may allow sharing and downloading of music from 
the  internet,  thus  encouraging  individuals  to  engage in 
such activity. A sanction, on the other hand, discourages 
them.  If  intrinsic  motivation  exerts  a  stronger  pull  on 
individual behavior than extrinsic incentives and the two 
incentives  encourage  clashing  behavior,  we  might 
observe more unintended results of legal intervention.
When intrinsic motivation is not aligned with extrinsic 
incentives we say that social norms have a countervailing 
effect. Specifically, in the case of legal intervention, this 
happens  when the  goals  the  legislature  pursues  or  the 
means  designed to  achieve  such  goals  are  not  aligned 
7
7
. See Uri  Gneezy  &  Aldo  Rustichini,  Incentives,  Punishment  and 
Behavior,  in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 572 (Colin F. Camerer et al. 
eds., 2003).
8
8
. See Iris  Bohnet  et  al.,  More  Order  with  Less  Law:  On  Contract 
Enforcement, Trust and Crowding, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 131, 141 (2001).
9
9
. John Borland,  RIAA Lawsuits Yield Mixed Results, NEWS.COM, Dec. 4, 
2003,  http://www.news.com/RIAA-lawsuits-yield-mixed-
results/2100-1027_3-5113188.html?tag=item.
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with current social norms. As a consequence, individuals 
face  legal  rules  clashing  with  their  sense  of  justice  or 
fairness, stemming principally from the social norms they 
follow.  Then,  the command of  social  norms counteracts 
the law, offsetting it.
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes 
in greater detail the interaction of extrinsic and intrinsic 
incentives;  section  3  presents  a  model  analyzing  the 
effects of  legal innovation; section 4 studies the role of 
countervailing  social  norms  and  introduces  the 
compliance  paradox;  section  5  provides  some  policy 
prescriptions  regarding  the  optimal  instruments  and 
timing  of  legal  innovation  in  the  presence  of 
countervailing  norms;  and  section  6  concludes, 
highlighting  the  possibility  of  countervailing  effects  of 
legal  norms  and  providing  some  interesting  historical 
cases.
2. THE BASIC MODEL:
INCENTIVES, INTERNALIZATION AND SOCIAL REACTION
THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN SOCIAL REACTION AND THE LAW
Behavioral  studies  of  responses  to  legal  commands 
generally  support  the  argument  that  the  law  affects 
human  choice  by  creating  external  “incentives”  and 
promoting  the  individual  “internalization”  of  the  values 
expressed by the law. More specifically,  deterrence and 
internalization are the two distinct ways in which the law 
can influence behavior.10
Legal  rules  can  create  incentives  by  affecting  the 
relative  cost  of  alternate  behavioral  choices.11 For 
example, by imposing a fine for an illegal activity the law 
raises the “price” of this activity relative to others. This 
change in relative prices will lead to a substitution effect 
and will  ultimately  affect  human behavior:  some illegal 
activities will be substituted for legal activities. Law and 
economics scholars refer to these effects of legal rules on 
10
1
. Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 
607–08  (1998)  [hereinafter  Expressive  Law].  See  generally  Robert 
Cooter,  Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of 
Internalized Norms,  86  VA.  L.  REV.  1577 (2000) [hereinafter  Do Good 
Laws Make Good Citizens?].
11. Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens?, supra note 10, at 1584.
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behavior as “incentives.”
Legal  rules  can  also  affect  behavior  through 
“internalization.”  Robert  Cooter,  law  professor  at  the 
University  of  California,  Berkeley,  developed  a  general 
theory  of  how  legal  rules  can  destroy  or  create  social 
norms through the expression of social values.12 According 
to Cooter, law may prompt citizens to adopt social norms 
without  changing  their  preferences,  or  “tastes.”13 Also, 
citizens  may  internalize  norms  by  changing  their  own 
tastes. He calls all these effects “expressive law.” Cooter 
focuses  on  situations  where  the  mere  creation  of  legal 
rules may change social conduct, even in the absence of 
enforced  legal  sanctions.14 He  refers  to  social 
psychological  research  suggesting  that  the  majority  of 
citizens obey laws out of internal respect for the law in 
general.15 Expressive law is most effective when it aligns 
with pre-existing social values: then it simply reduces the 
costs  of  private  enforcement  and  thus  facilitates  the 
values’  becoming  norms.16 Private  enforcement  follows 
two  distinct  channels.  The  first  channel  is  generally 
termed “first-party enforcement”: since individuals dislike 
disobeying the law, the (psychological) cost of performing 
a  given  action  increases  after  that  particular  action  is 
illegal.  Thus  people  are  induced  to  refrain  from  that 
action. The second channel goes through “second-,  and 
third-party  enforcement”:  once  a  given  behavior  is 
rendered illegal by the law, the subjects whose rights are 
protected by the law (second parties) and the community 
at large (third parties) may engage in private enforcement 
of the newly created legal rights by means of reprobation 
or possible reprisal. In these channels, the law acts as a 
signal  for  others  observing  violations.  Citizens  now feel 
entitled to exert extra-legal  enforcement in the form of 
open disapproval, ostracism or even physical punishment 
of those who fail to behave in accordance with the law.
12
1
. Id  at 1581.
13. See Expressive  Law,  supra  note  10, at  589  (defining  taste  as 
“strength of individual commitment to the norm”).
14. See Id. at 607.
15. Id. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).  There 
is, however, a danger that unaligned law may crowd out moral norms 
rather  than  create  them:  individuals  might  feel  it  unnecessary  to 
sanction violators of a norm if the government assumes this task.
16. Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens?, supra note 10, at 1597, 1601.
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It is generally recognized that the alignment of legal 
precepts and decisions of authorities with current social 
norms  and  values  has  a  positive  influence  on  people’s 
compliance  with  law,  even  when it  is  not  in  their  self-
interest  to do so.17 Legitimacy is  undermined when the 
content  of  the  law departs  from social  norms,  be  they 
based on moral, ethical, or merely cultural values.18 Tom 
Tyler’s individual work, as well as his combined work with 
Jason  Sunshine,  support  the argument  that  the public’s 
perceptions  of  a  law’s  legitimacy  affect  people’s 
compliance with the law.19
In  this  paper,  we  suggest  that  the  effects  of  law 
further depend on the social “reaction” triggered by legal 
innovation.  The  extent  of  social  reaction  to  a  new law 
depends on the degree of consistency of the new law with 
prior social values.
When the law differs from the socially desired level of 
regulation, we might observe a backlash in which society 
tries  to  correct  the  law and align  it  with  current  social 
norms. The law may differ from the desired level in two 
alternative ways: 1) the law may be too strict; or 2) the 
law  may  be  too  lenient  compared  to  what  society 
perceives as just.
When  the  law  exceeds  what  is  deemed  socially 
acceptable,  people  protest,  adopt  a  behavior  of  civil 
disobedience, and try to stop its enforcement. In general, 
they  approve  an  observed  infringement  of  the  “unjust 
law,” and they try to stop the application of  too-severe 
penalties.
In case the law falls short of the socially desired level, 
people  protest  and  try  themselves  to  apply  the  larger 
penalty  they  believe  correct.  Here,  people  show 
reprobation in front of an infringement of the (weak) law. 
Hence  social  reaction  may  reinforce  or  undermine  the 
effect of legal intervention, depending on whether the law 
is too strict or too weak compared to the social norms.
17
1
. See generally TYLER,  supra note 15.  See also TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. 
HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 
213 (2002) (with respect to the decisions of authorities).
18. See TYLER & HUO, supra note 17, at 213.
19. TYLER,  supra note 15, at 33;  Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler,  The 
Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for 
Policing, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513, 534 (2003).
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Absent initial alignment between legal rules and social 
values,  legislators  may  ensure  compliance  with  law 
through  the  creation  of  external  incentives  (i.e., 
sanctions). But, as it will be suggested below, reaction to 
unjust laws and countervailing norms may undermine the 
effect  of  legal  incentives.  Legal  coercion  may  be 
counterproductive in some cases.
THE ENDOGENOUS RISE OF SOCIAL NORMS
In the previous subsection we stressed the essential 
role that social  norms have in the determination of the 
final outcome of legal innovation. Before describing how 
social  norms affect  legal  compliance,  it  is  important  to 
understand how these norms emerge among individuals 
and  whether  enacting  laws  exactly  embodying  social 
norms  would  be  both  efficient  and  utterly  just  for  a 
legislator.
First,  we  should  ask  where  legal  norms  derive 
legitimacy. Conventions and social norms (intended as the 
basis on which customary law is  founded) are only one 
source of law, the others being legislation and judge-made 
law.
It is untrue that only laws based on social norms are 
just  laws—no  matter  how  they  are  perceived  by  the 
people.  As  David  Young  effectively  puts  it  in  his 
translation  of  Beccaria’s  Essay  on  Crimes  and 
Punishments:  “human  conventions  [. . .]  are  expressly 
formulated  or  simply  assumed  in  view  of  common 
necessity and utility.”20  It is therefore a strong statement 
to say that human conventions that form the bases for 
social norms are efficient and follow principles of justice. 
Conventions  are  a  way  that  people  coordinate  their 
behavior.21 Driving to the right (or to the left, in England) 
is a convention that allows two drivers facing each other 
to  avoid  collision.22 As  Bob Sugden effectively  explains, 
conventions typically spread because of past experience 
(last  time I  faced a driver,  he kept  the right),  common 
20
2
. CESARE BECCARIA,  AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 2 (David  Young 
trans., Hackett Publishing Co. 1986).
21. See Robert Sugden, Spontaneous Order, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 85, 87–88 
(1989).
22. See Id. at 90, 93.
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background and ideas, and analogy.23 There is  a strong 
path dependency in the adoption of a convention.  Path 
dependency implies that decisions are made following a 
backward  looking,  myopic  approach.  This  is  the  exact 
opposite  of  the  forward  looking,  rational  expectations 
approach.  Forward-looking  individuals  do  not  make 
systematic mistakes when making decisions. They are, on 
average,  correct.  They  are  therefore  able  to  spot  the 
convention that maximizes total surplus among the many 
possible conventions to which they may converge. On the 
contrary,  backward-looking  decision  makers  make 
systematic  errors  and can adopt the wrong convention, 
keeping it thereafter.24
The same can be said of justice as of efficiency. Many 
social conventions have become very strict social norms 
that limit the freedom, restrict the rights and diminish the 
dignity of women and ethnic minorities.25
Not  only  social  norms  but  even  “revelation  and 
natural law,” to use Beccaria’s words once again, “though 
divine and immutable, have been changed by human fault 
in  a  thousand  ways,  by  false  religion  and  by  arbitrary 
notions of vice and virtue in deprived minds.”26
That  is  why,  in  contrast  with  Cooter  and  the 
subsequent literature on expressive law, we consider the 
case in which laws do not align with pre-existing moral 
norms and social beliefs. Unlike Cooter’s ideal scenario of 
non-paternalistic  legal  intervention,27 we  allow  for 
paternalistic  intervention  aimed  at  manipulating  social 
beliefs and behavior. We do not assume that law, values, 
and existing social norms are aligned. In our setting, laws 
can  be  enacted  that  clash  with  existing  social  norms, 
inducing  civil  disobedience  and  reinforcing  the  social 
values contrary to law.
We  study  the  dynamic  characteristics  of  the 
interaction between individual  values and laws,  and we 
23
2
. See Id. at 85–97.
24. See Id. at 97.
25. See  generally Emanuela  Carbonara  &  Piero  Pasotti,  Social 
Dynamics  and  the  Enforcement  of  Minority  Protection  Norms (June 
2006)  (unpublished  manuscript,  on  file  with  author),  available  at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/  papers.cfm?
abstract_id=906635#PaperDownload.
26. See BECCARIA, supra note 21, at 5.
27. See Do Laws Make Good Citizens?, supra note 10, at 1577–81.
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prove  that  existing  social  norms  may  trigger 
countervailing  effects  when  a  new  law  is  passed.  As 
pointed  out  above,  this  happens  when  the  new  law  is 
more severe than people would support on average.
Although we will deal mainly with cases where the law 
is  too  severe,  we  are  aware  that  there  are  several 
examples of protests against laws that were perceived by 
society  as  being too lenient.  For  instance,  consider  the 
protest that  followed decriminalization  of  homosexuality 
amongst adults  in Germany in the sixties or the recent 
protest  in  Italy  following  a  proposed  bill  allowing  gay 
marriage. Similarly, the promulgation of laws supporting a 
woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy have given rise 
to political and social battles over abortion rights in many 
countries.  In  the  United  States  this  happened  in  1973, 
with  the Supreme Court  decision in  Roe v.  Wade.28 We 
argue  that  this  type  of  protest  is  likely  to  have  no 
countervailing effects on behavior.29 As mentioned above, 
when people protest against a law being too soft, there is 
no  effect  on  deterrence,  and  we  may  even  observe 
private enforcement of social norms with the imposition of 
private  sanctions.  This  may  result  in  strengthened 
deterrence  and  further  reduction  of  violations.  There  is 
evidence that antiabortion activities have had a significant 
impact  on  the  reduction  of  the  quantity  of  abortion 
services demanded and supplied in the United States.30
When a law is perceived as unfairly strict, people can 
either voice dissent or be silent. In addition to that, people 
can also act against the law, violating it. We argue that 
protest is the most effective means of opinion formation. 
Violations can be the result of civil disobedience, but they 
can also be motivated by private benefit. It is difficult for 
observers to disentangle the real motivation of violators.
28
2
. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
29. This is not to say that a law perceived as too lenient does not pose 
problems. Private enforcement of social norms may severely limit the 
exercise  of  personal  rights  or  may adopt  violent  and  illegal  means. 
Moreover, where a socially efficient level of the regulated activity exists, 
private enforcement may lead to underperformance. However, since the 
research  presented  in  this  paper  deals  with  the  existence  of 
countervailing effects not produced by too lenient laws, we choose to 
leave this aspect to future research.
30
3
. See  generally Leo  H.  Kahane,  Anti-Abortion  Activities  and  the 
Market for Abortion Services: Protest as a Disincentive, 59 AM. J. ECON. & 
SOC. 463 (2000).
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We  are  now  ready  to  analyze  the  effects  of  legal 
innovation in the presence of countervailing social norms 
and  to  understand  the  conditions  under  which  the 
compliance paradox can occur (i.e., a situation where an 
increase in the strictness of the law reduces compliance).
3. THE EFFECTS OF LEGAL INNOVATION
Although  we  have  stressed  the  impact  that  social 
values  and  norms  have  on  compliance,  we  should  be 
aware that such values are not immutable. Hence it is not 
given  a  priori that  a  law  departing  from current  social 
values will be inevitably defeated.
Social  values  change  over  time.  Paternalistic  legal 
intervention  aimed  at  changing  a  well  rooted  social 
behavior  has  an  impact  on  social  norms.  Consider  the 
example of the enactment of a law that prohibits smoking 
in  public  places  in  a  community  accustomed  to  public 
smoking. The new law could impose a sanction to deter 
individuals  from  smoking  in  public  places,  and  the 
sanction  would  increase  the  relative  price  of  the 
sanctioned  activity  possibly  leading  to  a  substitution 
toward  other  non-sanctioned  activities.  Legal  external 
incentives leading to a substitution and thus behavioral 
changes may affect individual preferences in the long-run, 
contributing to a change in conventions and then in social 
norms.
INTERNALIZATION EFFECT
In addition to the extrinsic incentives just described, 
there are also intrinsic incentives provided by a new law. 
These  intrinsic  incentives  may  affect  the  evolution  of 
preexisting  social  values.  In  the  discussion  above,  we 
considered intrinsic motivations as possible antagonists of 
extrinsic  incentives,  and  we  drew  an  almost  exclusive 
analogy between intrinsic motivation and social norms. In 
this subsection we want to highlight the multifarious and 
dynamic  character  of  intrinsic  motivation,  showing  how 
some components of it can exert pressure on social norms 
and move them in the direction desired by the legislator.
A  powerful  social  norm,  and  one  of  the  main 
constituents of individual intrinsic motivation, is the desire 
to obey to the law. According to Cooter, citizens are often 
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willing  to  pay  to  do  their  civic  duties,  which  includes 
following  the  rules.31 Enacting  a  strict  law  that  heavily 
punishes a given behavior is a clear signal that the State 
considers  deterring  citizens  from  performing  that 
sanctioned action primarily important. This is exactly what 
is defined as the “expressive power of the law,”32 and this 
theory acts on other social norms, bending them towards 
the values embedded in the law.
Legal  rules  differ  in  their  expressive  power.33 Laws 
with a strong expressive power are laws which citizens are 
willing to obey, even if obedience is very costly for them. 
In general, expressive power outweighs the possible effect 
of countervailing social norms and possibly changes these 
norms over time, resulting in increased acceptance of the 
initially  controversial  law.  In  such  a  case,  the  values 
expressed by the new law are internalized by people and 
gradually  modify  pre-existing  social  opinions,  which  is 
exactly what is meant by “internalization.”34
In our working example, a new statute that prohibits 
smoking  in  public  places  or  that  heavily  punishes 
copyright  infringement,  expresses  values  that  may  be 
internalized  by  individuals.  If  individuals  internalize  the 
value  expressed by the law,  the law could  increase  its 
effectiveness, and potentially affect behavior even in the 
absence  of  direct  incentives.  In  the  specific  examples 
above,  non-legal  enforcement  mechanisms  could  be 
triggered. Individuals who internalize the value expressed 
by  the  law  could  engage  in  first-party  enforcement, 
suffering  guilt  or  shame when violating  the  prohibition. 
Likewise, second-party and third-party enforcement could 
be  carried  out  by  non-smokers  and  by  people  not 
engaging in the download of copyrighted material against 
31
3
. See Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens?,  supra note 10, at 1581–
84.
32. Expressive Law,  supra note 10, at 595 (“The expressive theory of 
law holds that eliciting voluntary obedience from most citizens make 
law  effective,  and  the  effects  may  be  greater  than  applying  state 
sanctions to a few recalcitrant wrongdoers.”).
33. It  would  be  interesting  to  analyze  the  determinants  of  the 
expressive power. In general, it seems that the expressive power of a 
law is inversely related with the degree of  forcefulness of  the social 
values the law tries to bend. However, literature on this specific issue is 
almost non-existent.
34. See generally Expressive Law, supra note 10.
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those  who  violate  the  law.  Internalization  of  the  value 
expressed by the law reduces and possibly eliminates the 
need to enforce the legal incentives.
REACTION EFFECT
So far we have considered the evolution of intrinsic 
motivation  when  the  expressive  effect  of  the  newly 
enacted  law  is  strong  enough  to  bend  existing  social 
norms. However, as argued above, social norms are not 
passive but, instead, react to the introduction of new legal 
rules.
A new law that is contrary to current social values or 
more restrictive than what people would support triggers 
opposition,  both  in  the  form  of  open  protest  and  civil 
disobedience.
To  continue  with  our  previous  examples,  several 
instances  of  such  behavior  can  be  found  in  relation  to 
severe  punishments  recently  adopted  against  copyright 
infringers. Ville Oksanen and Mikko Välimäki, members of 
the Helsinki  Institute  for  Information  Technology,  report 
several examples of countervailing social norms followed 
among Internet file sharers.35 One such example is that of 
Jesse Jordan, a teenager who created a search engine for 
music  files.  He  was  sued  by  the  Recording  Industry 
Association  of  America  (RIAA),  which  demanded  $900 
million. Jordan was forced to settle his case, agreeing to 
pay $12,000, which, according to  Oksanen and Välimäki, 
“he had saved to pay his tuition at college.”36 The reaction 
of Internet users was immediate. Far from being scared by 
the RIAA’s threat,  they engaged in fund raising, “which 
raised enough money for Jordan to fully cover the price of 
his settlement.”37
Similarly, in October 2007, an American woman from 
Minnesota was convicted for having downloaded 24 songs 
from the Internet,  and she was fined $222,000 ($9,250 
per song downloaded).38 It  was an important victory for 
35
3
. Ville  Oksanen  &  Mikko  Välimäki,  Theory  of  Deterrence  and 
Individual Behavior. Can Lawsuits Control File Sharing on the Internet?, 
3 REV. L. & ECON. 693 (2007).
36. Id. at 706.
37. Id.
38. Jeff Leeds,  Labels Win Suit Against Song Sharer,  N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 
2007 at C1.
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the RIAA, but it also spawned a strong wave of protest. 
Commentators believe that this is a false victory and that 
it will result in backlash against the music industry, as has 
happened in the past.39
Thus,  if  new  legal  prohibitions  clash  with  existing 
social  values,  they may induce reaction.  The degree of 
reaction  to  legal  prohibitions  obviously  varies  with  the 
extent to which the new law departs from current social 
norms.
Negative social reactions to a new law may weaken 
and undermine the effects of legal intervention. As shown 
in  our  previous  economic  paper,  through  an  opinion 
formation  process,  individual  negative  reactions  may 
reinforce  other  individuals’  dislike  of  the  law,  with 
countervailing effects.40
If the expressive power of the law is not very strong, a 
sudden increase in the strictness of the law may lead to 
countervailing effects, where the situation after the legal 
change is one with high protest and an increased rate of 
violations  compared  to  the  initial  situation.  An  initial 
reaction to unfair laws may occasion a shift in equilibrium 
behavior  that  goes  in  the  opposite  direction  from  that 
intended by the law.41
4. LEGAL INNOVATION AND THE ROLE OF 
COUNTERVAILING NORMS
The argument presented in the previous sections can 
be summarized as follows. Human behavior is influenced 
by both external incentives (prices and sanctions) and by 
intrinsic  motivations.  Two  main  components  of  intrinsic 
motivation are of interest in our analysis: the preference 
individuals have for obeying to the law—independent of 
its content—and the influence that social norms exert on 
behavior.
When legal  innovation  aligns with  preexisting social 
values, these two components move preferences in the 
same direction, forcing internalization. Conversely, when 
the law departs from current social values, the expressive 
and  reaction  effects  will  play  opposite  roles.  The  final 
39
3
. Id.
40
4
. See Carbonara et al., supra note 1, at 6.
41. Id.
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outcome and the ability of the legislator to achieve her 
intended  goal  depends  on  the  relative  magnitude  of 
external incentives, expressive and reaction effects. A law 
will have a positive marginal impact on behavior when the 
sum of incentives and expressive effects outweighs the 
reaction effects. In other papers, the authors of this article 
carried out an economic study of the dynamic interaction 
of  these  three  factors  and  their  impact  on  legal 
compliance, identifying several possible scenarios.42 In the 
following sections, we provide an account of the results of 
our economic models.
BALANCING THE EFFECTS OF LEGAL INTERVENTION
Consider  a  simple  framework  in  which  individuals 
have to decide whether to obey a given law or not. Their 
decision  is  influenced,  among  other  factors,  by  the 
magnitude of the sanction that would be imposed in case 
of  non-compliance,  by  the  strength  of  the  expressive 
power,  and by the extent of  protest that a specific law 
generates. We follow the traditional  economic model by 
assuming  that  individuals  are  more  prone  to  obey  the 
higher the sanction. We also follow the literature on the 
expressive function of the law assuming that the stronger 
the expressive power, the higher the intrinsic incentive to 
obey. The new element we introduce in the analysis is the 
effect  of  protest  on  compliance.  The  more  individuals 
engage in social protest against the law, the less likely it 
is that people will obey to the new law.
To understand why this may be the case, one should 
consider  that  protest  is  a  public  expression  of  dissent, 
which  reveals  that  the  law clashes  with  the  protesters’ 
shared values. A visible and popular protest shows that 
the new law does not reflect social norms.
The generalized level of protest in a society depends 
positively on the strictness of the law.43 The stricter the 
42
4
. Id.; see Parisi & Wangenheim, supra note 1.
43. In  general,  we  may  devise  two  alternative  definitions  for  the 
strictness of the law. A first, straightforward definition is based on the 
amount of the sanction imposed to violators: the higher the sanction, 
the stricter the law. A law that imposes life sentence for homicide is a 
very strict law. A second possible definition is based on the extent of 
the prohibition prescribed by the law. A law that prohibits smoking in 
parks and streets is more restrictive than a law that prohibits smoking 
only  in  closed  public  spaces,  like  restaurants  and  cinemas.  Both 
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new law, the higher the upsurge in protest. The intuition 
behind this statement can be provided by the following 
example.  Consider  the  case  where  individual  i believes 
that  sharing  music  over  the  Internet  is  wrongful  and 
believes that somebody downloading one song should be 
fined  $10.  Now  assume  that  the  law  prescribes  a  fine 
equal to $2,000. Such an individual could disapprove of 
the excessive harshness of the law and empathize with 
the “wrongdoer” who suffers a harsh punishment for such 
a minor crime.
When  the  law  has  a  strong  expressive  power,  the 
combined  effect  of  incentives  and  internalization  will 
dominate  the  effect  of  reaction.  An  increase  in  the 
severity  of  the law would suffice to counterbalance the 
effect of protest and increase legal compliance. When the 
instrument  of  legal  innovation  has  a  strong  expressive 
power, the enactment of a law backed by an enforceable 
sanction will thus have its normal effect of reducing the 
rate of violations. This will ensure that legal intervention 
produces  its  intended  effects  with  a  dominance  of 
incentive effects.
This case is depicted in Figure 1. Define x as the rate 
of  violations of  the law, and  p the level  of protest.  The 
variable  x represents  the  percentage  of  individuals 
disobeying  the  law,  be  that  civil  disobedience  or  mere 
illegal behavior. Protest p is the percentage of individuals 
expressing dissent towards the law. As argued above, a 
law  that  is  contrary  to  current  social  values  or  more 
restrictive than people  would ordinarily  support  triggers 
an  increase  in  protest.  For  a  given  sanction  and 
expressive power, the rate of violations is an increasing 
function  of  protest.  The  rate  of  violations  depends 
negatively on the sanction S, meaning that the function x 
(p) shifts downwards when a stricter law is passed, due to 
the  incentive  and  internalization  effects.  Figure  1 
considers a case in which a legal  change is introduced. 
The new legal standard is  B, raising the strictness of the 
preceding law.  In  our  example,  this  is  accomplished by 
increasing the sanction imposed to violators from a given 
SA to SB. This has two distinct effects. It decreases the rate 
of  violations  for  a  given  level  of  social  protest  (effect 
definitions are interchangeable in our analysis.
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represented by the shift of the curve x (p) from xA (p) to 
xB (p)) and it increases protest from pA to  pB. In Figure 1, 
the shift in protest is not high enough to compensate the 
incentive and the expressive effects, so that the new rate 
of violations, xB, is lower than the initial one, xA.
Figure 1
THE COMPLIANCE PARADOX
We now consider a case in which the law does not 
have a strong expressive power, but social reaction to the 
legal  change is  significant.  Here the combined effect of 
incentives  and  internalization  may  not  be  sufficient  to 
dominate the effect of reaction.
Figure 2
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This second case is depicted in Figure 2.  Again,  we 
consider an increase in the sanction from  SA to  SB.  This 
produces the shift of the curve x (p), from xA (p) to xB (p), 
and it increases protest from pA to pB’. As it is possible to 
see from Figure 2, in this case the increase in protest is 
substantial,  and  more  than  compensates  the  incentive 
and the expressive effect. The new rate of violations, xB’, 
is now larger than the initial one, xA.
Adding  incentives  by  exacerbating  legal  sanctions 
may be counterproductive in this case. When the new law 
departs from preexisting social values, a more repressive 
law  is  likely  to  induce  more  individuals  to  react  with 
protest.  The final  large number of  protesters sustains a 
high level of violations of the new, more restrictive, law.
These unintended effects of legal intervention would 
thus  lead  to  a  compliance  paradox—an  increase  in  the 
strictness of  the law would lead to an increase in legal 
violations, defeating the goals pursued by the lawmaker.
SOCIAL OUTRAGE AND HYSTERESIS
So far  we have assumed that  protest  reacts  to the 
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“absolute  strictness”  of  the  law.  In  other  words,  a  law 
sanctioning shoplifting with ten years in jail raises more 
social  reaction  than  a  law  sanctioning  it  with  just  ten 
months in jail. It is generally true that absolute strictness, 
as defined above, influences the extent to which a given 
law  receives  social  support  rather  than  rejection. 
However,  it  is  also true that  protest is  spawned by the 
relative  change  of  the  law.  If,  to  continue  with  our 
example,  the sanction for  shoplifting is  raised from ten 
months to ten years  in jail,  this  is  likely  to raise  much 
more protest and social reaction than a case where the 
sanction increases from ten months to one year.
From  this  we  can  derive  another  important 
implication: if protest reacts to the relative change in the 
strictness, laws that are perceived as excessively strict or 
even  unjust  when  enacted  could  be  tolerated  and 
eventually  accepted  over  time.  In  other  words,  protest 
subsides after some time.  This is tantamount to saying 
that people get used to a given strictness over time.
The initial reaction may, however, lead to reinforcing 
contrary  social  opinion  and,  through  a  process  of 
hysteresis, may produce a permanent increase in protest 
in the long run, even after the initial effect due to social 
outrage subsides.44 This phenomenon can be explained in 
terms of Figure 2. Assume that the new legal standard, SB, 
is much higher than SA. Its enactment provokes a big leap 
in  protest,  bringing  it  to  a  very  high  level,  say  further 
beyond pB’. After some time, people get used to the new 
legal  standard  and  protest  decreases.  However,  due  to 
hysteresis, protest will stabilize at  pB’, where the rate of 
violations  has  increased  with  respect  to  the  situation 
existing before the new legal standard was introduced.
If the process of hysteresis is positively linked to the 
maximum level of protest reached after the enactment of 
the  new  law,  the  bigger  the  difference  between  the 
current  and  the  new  legal  standard,  the  higher  the 
probability  that  countervailing  effects  will  lead  to  the 
compliance paradox.45 To see this, consider a case where 
44
4
. When a system presents  hysteresis,  its  reactions to an external 
influence  depend  both  on  the  actual  magnitude  of  that  specific 
influence and on the previous history of the system. In other words, the 
system presents “path dependency”.
45. For a formal analysis of this case see Carbonara et al., supra note 
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the new legal standard is not much higher that SA. Even if 
protest initially  raises  to a level  beyond  pB in  Figure 2, 
when people get used to the new standard, protest will 
subside to pB, which is very close to pA. In such a case, the 
increased sanction decreases overall disobedience. If the 
legislator proceeds to implement small consecutive legal 
changes, protest may stay close to pA in the long run while 
the sanction eventually reaches a very high level with a 
maximum deterrent effect.
In  the  next  section  we  will  derive  some  policy 
prescriptions useful to avoid the compliance paradox.
5. CHOOSING OPTIMAL INSTRUMENTS OF LEGAL 
INNOVATION
The law affects behavior through different channels. 
First,  as  discussed  above,  the  law  impacts  individual 
choices  by  creating  deterrence  through  incentives. 
Second, the law operates though internalization. Finally, 
the law has effects on behavior through social reaction. 
The combination of these elements ultimately determines 
the effectiveness of legal intervention. Lawmakers should 
thus  design  law  in  order  to  induce  an  appropriate 
balancing  of  incentives,  internalization  and  reaction 
effects.
First  of  all,  the  existence  of  a  compliance  paradox 
indicates  that  statutes  intending  to  induce  substantial 
shifts  from  current  norms  may  have  to  proceed  in  a 
gradual  fashion.  Moving  the  statute  in  the  desired 
direction  in  small,  consecutive  steps  that  allow  for  the 
gradual adaptation of the individual values to the values 
expressed  in  the  statutes,  will  avoid  the  countervailing 
effect  of  internal  norms—the  disobedience  rate  will  be 
small  in every step. If  the legal change is implemented 
gradually, individuals have  the time they need to adapt 
their internal values to the content of law.
A  good  example  of  gradual  implementation  that 
avoided potentially strong countervailing effects are laws 
prohibiting smoking in public places. In Italy, for example, 
smoking was prohibited first in hospitals and schools, then 
in trains and finally in restaurants. The latter stage was 
preceded  by  a  thorough  press  campaign  stressing  the 
1.
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damages due to smoking, both active and passive. As a 
result,  the  law  was  quite  successful,  with  very  little 
protest,  and  resulted  in  a  substantial  reduction  in  the 
number of smokers in public places. In the United States, 
a similar trend was followed and the law is now becoming 
more  and  more  restrictive  with  little  protest.  In  some 
cities, laws prohibit smoking even in private places.46
The compliance paradox suggests another interesting 
solution. Countervailing effects of social reaction could be 
exploited  as  a  policy  instrument  and  legal  deterrence 
could be increased by reducing the strictness of the law.
Music  downloading  and  peer-to-peer  sharing  could 
constitute  an  interesting  test  of  this  innovative  theory. 
When  harsh  decisions,  like  the  one  in  Minnesota,47 are 
made,  more  and  more  people  start  seeing  the  music 
industry as “evil” and start acting to harm it. Because of 
the compliance paradox, decisions like these can act like 
a “boomerang” against the music labels, contributing to 
its  decline  by  increasing  the  extent  of  copyright 
infringement.48
A  way  to  solve  the  problem of  piracy  (not  only  of 
digital  goods  but  also  of  counterfeited  fashion  goods) 
would be to impose much lower fines. This would increase 
the number of cases where the fine is actually applied and 
the deterrence effect would be magnified.
When gradual adjustments are not possible (e.g., due 
to the discrete nature of  legal  change or  not  viable  on 
political  grounds),  legislative  change  should  use 
instruments  other  than  sanctions  to  obtain  the  desired 
result.  This  should  be  done  to  avoid  too  much  public 
protest (and the consequent high level of disobedience), 
as  those  activities  undermine  the  authority  and 
acceptance of the enacted law.  Taxes might be a better 
option  in  such  cases,  as  they  are  less  likely  to  trigger 
“countervailing-norm” effects, even if  laws accompanied 
by sanctions contain a stronger “expressive value.”
In this respect, our analysis also provides insights for 
the understanding of the effect of positive and negative 
46
4
. E.g.,  BELMONT CITY,  CAL.,  MUN.  CODE §  20.5  (2007),  available  at 
http://www.belmont.gov/SubContent.asp?
CatId=240001398&C_ID=240002690.
47. See Leeds, supra note 38.
48. Id.
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incentives. The reward of a non-violation may be seen as 
equivalent  (in  incentive  terms)  to  the  sanctioning  of  a 
violation.  This  equivalence  may  be  lost  when  the 
expressive  and  countervailing  effects  are  taken  into 
account. While positive and negative incentives may have 
similar  expressive effects,  they may also have opposite 
countervailing-norms effects. The giving of a reward is, in 
fact, less likely to trigger reaction than the imposition of a 
punishment.
Finally,  our  model  sheds  new  light  on  the  debate 
between  the  magnitude  and  the  probability  of  a  fine, 
ignited by professor Gary Becker in 1968.49 As well-known 
in the literature, the same expected fine can be generated 
with infinite combinations of probability versus magnitude 
of a sanction. Given that increasing the probability of a 
sanction  entails  high  costs  and  that  increasing  the 
magnitude  of  the  fine  is  not  as  costly,  the  conclusion 
supported  in  the  past  is  that  the  tradeoff  between 
probability and magnitude should be resolved by setting 
the maximum fine possible and reducing the probability of 
application.50 In  light  of  our  results,  the  choice  of 
probability  and  magnitude  combinations  may  have 
different effects with respect to countervailing norms. This 
might  substantially  change the policy  recommendations 
drawn from that model. The analysis of the consequences 
of  countervailing  norms  on  the  optimal  combination  of 
probability  versus magnitude of  a fine is  left  for  future 
research.
CONCLUSIONS
In  this  paper  we  have  analyzed  the  interaction 
between  legal  and  social  norms,  highlighting  the 
possibility  of  countervailing  effects  of  legal  norms.  In 
general, it is very likely that rules that depart from current 
social  norms  and  individual  values  trigger  opposition, 
leading to an upsurge in protest and even to an increase 
in  disobedience.  We have assumed that  individuals can 
express  their  dissent  against  the  law.  By  engaging  in 
protest and disobedience, individuals reveal their values 
49
4
. Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. 
POL. ECON. 169, 190–98 (1968).
50
5
. Id.
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to others, which might result in a reinforcement of other 
individuals’ dislike of the law.
Therefore,  the  alignment  of  the  law  to  existing 
morality is critical for the preservation of legitimacy and 
the ability  of  law to effectively  shape conduct.  As  laws 
depart from shared moral values, the influence of law on 
social  norms  becomes  indeterminate.  Laws  that  depart 
only  slightly  from  the  current  mode  may  occasion  a 
gradual adaptation of the opinions to the new statute. For 
example, the criminal law’s influence as a moral authority 
has effect primarily at the borderline of criminal activity, 
where there may be some ambiguity as to whether the 
conduct really is wrong. Here the law drives the evolution 
of norms in the same direction of the law.
In other cases, new statutes, which differ substantially 
from the current opinion mode, may lead to opposition. 
Dissent  may  result  from  a  discrepancy  between  the 
present state of the law and the prevailing public attitude 
toward  the  regulated  conduct.  Some  individuals  will 
manifest  their  dissent  by expressing their  opposition to 
others  (protest),  while  others  will  oppose  the  law  by 
ostensibly violating it (civil disobedience). Protest and civil 
disobedience  signal  dissent  and,  through  a  process  of 
hysteresis, may lead to reinforcing contrary social opinion.
Different types of disobedience have been identified 
in  the  literature.  Civil  disobedience  may  be  a  protest 
against  laws  that  infringe  against  what  individuals 
perceive  to  be  their  natural  rights.  Protest  and  civil 
disobedience can be directed at laws perceived either as 
too strict or too lenient compared to the current opinion.
Similarly,  civil  disobedience  can  take  the  form of  a 
protest against the failure of the law to recognize or fulfill 
individual  rights  and  expectations.  This  second  form of 
disobedience  is  the  assertion  of  a  right  that  is  not 
recognized in the existing system of law. In this case, a 
violator  attempts  to  assert  that  a  right  which  is  not 
recognized by law today, ought to be recognized, or that 
the  existing  legal  language  must  be  interpreted  to 
recognize  such  right.  While  the  assertion  of  a  positive 
legal right is justified on legal grounds, the assertion of 
non-recognized  law  can  be  justified  on  moral  grounds. 
Examples  of  such  disobedience  can  be  found  in  the 
various forms of protest in the area of human rights law. 
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Historically, this form of civil disobedience has been very 
valuable  to  society,  allowing  acceptance  and  gradual 
discovery of new rights in ways that would not have been 
developed  through  traditional  political  or  lawmaking 
processes.
Although  in  the  text  we  have  provided  several 
examples  obtained  from  current  commonplace 
experiences,  there  are  also  some  interesting  historical 
cases.  For  instance,  Harvard  University  Law  Professor 
William J.  Stuntz considers how criminal  law can defeat 
itself due to the lack of alignment between criminal laws 
and  laypeople’s  values  and  norms,  generating 
disobedience rather than obedience.51 Stuntz focuses on 
vice crimes  (e.g.,  drinking during  Prohibition,  gambling) 
and highly divisive “moral” crimes (e.g., sodomy, slavery), 
noting that vice crime enforcement has historically been 
concentrated upon poor and urban neighborhoods.52 Such 
enforcement  led  to  the  perception  that  these  policies 
were  driven  by  racial  or  class  bias  rather  than  moral 
justice,  corroding  the  authority  of  the  law  for  a  larger 
portion  of  the  public.53 These  examples  are  good 
illustrations  of  how  law  can  positively  or  negatively 
influence social norms. Moral crimes, involving issues over 
which public opinion is widely split, tend to have a set of 
people “on the fence,” highly susceptible to persuasion. 
Consequently,  effective  media  coverage  of  criminalized 
activities  can  positively  influence  individual  beliefs, 
creating  a  critical  mass  necessary  to  create  a  self-
reinforcing norm. On the contrary, other persecutory laws 
may laws generated sympathy for the targeted class of 
violators generating dominant social support for tolerance 
or repeal of the criminalizing law.54
In this paper we have presented a simple model able 
to give account of the mechanisms described above. We 
have  considered  the  role  of  law  in  influencing  human 
choice through external incentives and internalization. In 
contrast  with  previous  literature,  we  have  considered 
explicitly  the  case  of  laws  that  do  not  align  with  pre-
51
5
. William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1872 
(2000).
52. See generally id.
53. Id. at 1872.
54. See id.
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existing moral norms and social beliefs. We have studied 
the  dynamic  characteristics  of  the  interaction  between 
individual  values  and  laws,  proving  that  existing  social 
norms may trigger countervailing effects when a new law 
is passed.
We  have  shown  that  when  the  law  has  a  strong 
expressive power, an increase in the severity of the law 
always has the effect of silencing protest and reduces the 
rate of violations. This is because a law with a very high 
expressive  power  is  never  countervailing.  On the  other 
hand,  if  the  expressive  power  of  the  law  is  not  very 
strong, a sudden increase in the strictness of the law may 
lead  to  countervailing  effects,  where  the  situation  after 
the legal change is one with high protest and an increased 
rate of violations compared to the initial situation. Thus, 
statutes  intending  to  induce  substantial  shifts  from 
current norms may have to proceed in a gradual fashion. 
When gradual change is not possible, other instruments 
than  sanctions  should  be  used,  like  taxes.  Finally,  the 
legislator  could  make  instrumental  use  of  the 
countervailing effect of social norms. When countervailing 
effects are very strong, a more lenient law may have a 
higher impact on deterrence than implementing a severe 
law.
Future work should consider the possibility of long-run 
effects  of  legal  innovations  that  that  run  contrary  to 
prevailing  social  wisdom.  If  lawmakers  enact  pieces  of 
legislation that too frequently deviate from existing social 
norms, the long-run expressive effect of the law may be 
undermined. Insofar as people are inclined to follow legal 
rules because they are the law,  they may become less 
inclined to do so if they frequently observe that the law 
runs contrary  to prevailing  social  wisdom.  A systematic 
discrepancy between the law and the preexisting social 
norms may render the law objectionable and undermine 
the legitimacy of legal intervention in the long-run.
